From c903ca6a227cd190b270c52ac3a84ad2148c9651 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 11:55:56 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 01/11] s3: smbd: Create wrapper function for OpenDir in preparation for making robust. CVE-2017-2619 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison --- source3/smbd/dir.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/source3/smbd/dir.c b/source3/smbd/dir.c index 3805915..cbd32e3 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/dir.c +++ b/source3/smbd/dir.c @@ -1588,7 +1588,8 @@ static int smb_Dir_destructor(struct smb_Dir *dirp) Open a directory. ********************************************************************/ -struct smb_Dir *OpenDir(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, +static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_internal(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + connection_struct *conn, const char *name, const char *mask, uint32_t attr) @@ -1628,6 +1629,18 @@ struct smb_Dir *OpenDir(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, return NULL; } +struct smb_Dir *OpenDir(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, + const char *name, + const char *mask, + uint32_t attr) +{ + return OpenDir_internal(mem_ctx, + conn, + name, + mask, + attr); +} + /******************************************************************* Open a directory from an fsp. ********************************************************************/ -- 2.9.3 From ef03034fd0b89f64983444d662ff16d8fe2f2f0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 16:25:26 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 02/11] s3: smbd: Opendir_internal() early return if SMB_VFS_OPENDIR failed. CVE-2017-2619 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison --- source3/smbd/dir.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/source3/smbd/dir.c b/source3/smbd/dir.c index cbd32e3..ea4b301 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/dir.c +++ b/source3/smbd/dir.c @@ -1601,20 +1601,12 @@ static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_internal(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, return NULL; } - dirp->conn = conn; - dirp->name_cache_size = lp_directory_name_cache_size(SNUM(conn)); - dirp->dir_path = talloc_strdup(dirp, name); if (!dirp->dir_path) { errno = ENOMEM; goto fail; } - if (sconn && !sconn->using_smb2) { - sconn->searches.dirhandles_open++; - } - talloc_set_destructor(dirp, smb_Dir_destructor); - dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_OPENDIR(conn, dirp->dir_path, mask, attr); if (!dirp->dir) { DEBUG(5,("OpenDir: Can't open %s. %s\n", dirp->dir_path, @@ -1622,6 +1614,14 @@ static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_internal(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, goto fail; } + dirp->conn = conn; + dirp->name_cache_size = lp_directory_name_cache_size(SNUM(conn)); + + if (sconn && !sconn->using_smb2) { + sconn->searches.dirhandles_open++; + } + talloc_set_destructor(dirp, smb_Dir_destructor); + return dirp; fail: -- 2.9.3 From 0c3c22f38b0864e9894647aad1a4bc0241b9f4ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 16:35:00 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 03/11] s3: smbd: Create and use open_dir_safely(). Use from OpenDir(). Hardens OpenDir against TOC/TOU races. CVE-2017-2619 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison --- source3/smbd/dir.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/source3/smbd/dir.c b/source3/smbd/dir.c index ea4b301..39a6e67 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/dir.c +++ b/source3/smbd/dir.c @@ -1601,15 +1601,9 @@ static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_internal(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, return NULL; } - dirp->dir_path = talloc_strdup(dirp, name); - if (!dirp->dir_path) { - errno = ENOMEM; - goto fail; - } - - dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_OPENDIR(conn, dirp->dir_path, mask, attr); + dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_OPENDIR(conn, name, mask, attr); if (!dirp->dir) { - DEBUG(5,("OpenDir: Can't open %s. %s\n", dirp->dir_path, + DEBUG(5,("OpenDir: Can't open %s. %s\n", name, strerror(errno) )); goto fail; } @@ -1629,12 +1623,70 @@ static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_internal(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, return NULL; } +/**************************************************************************** + Open a directory handle by pathname, ensuring it's under the share path. +****************************************************************************/ + +static struct smb_Dir *open_dir_safely(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + connection_struct *conn, + const char *name, + const char *wcard, + uint32_t attr) +{ + struct smb_Dir *dir_hnd = NULL; + char *saved_dir = vfs_GetWd(ctx, conn); + NTSTATUS status; + + if (saved_dir == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + if (vfs_ChDir(conn, name) == -1) { + goto out; + } + + /* + * Now the directory is pinned, use + * REALPATH to ensure we can access it. + */ + status = check_name(conn, "."); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + goto out; + } + + dir_hnd = OpenDir_internal(ctx, + conn, + ".", + wcard, + attr); + + if (dir_hnd == NULL) { + goto out; + } + + /* + * OpenDir_internal only gets "." as the dir name. + * Store the real dir name here. + */ + + dir_hnd->dir_path = talloc_strdup(dir_hnd, name); + if (!dir_hnd->dir_path) { + errno = ENOMEM; + } + + out: + + vfs_ChDir(conn, saved_dir); + TALLOC_FREE(saved_dir); + return dir_hnd; +} + struct smb_Dir *OpenDir(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, const char *name, const char *mask, uint32_t attr) { - return OpenDir_internal(mem_ctx, + return open_dir_safely(mem_ctx, conn, name, mask, -- 2.9.3 From 39589a2b7de5768cc515bce58dd243d711e58fd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 12:13:20 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 04/11] s3: smbd: OpenDir_fsp() use early returns. CVE-2017-2619 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison --- source3/smbd/dir.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/source3/smbd/dir.c b/source3/smbd/dir.c index 39a6e67..ea4f1ab 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/dir.c +++ b/source3/smbd/dir.c @@ -1706,7 +1706,17 @@ static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_fsp(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = conn->sconn; if (!dirp) { - return NULL; + goto fail; + } + + if (!fsp->is_directory) { + errno = EBADF; + goto fail; + } + + if (fsp->fh->fd == -1) { + errno = EBADF; + goto fail; } dirp->conn = conn; @@ -1723,18 +1733,16 @@ static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_fsp(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, } talloc_set_destructor(dirp, smb_Dir_destructor); - if (fsp->is_directory && fsp->fh->fd != -1) { - dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_FDOPENDIR(fsp, mask, attr); - if (dirp->dir != NULL) { - dirp->fsp = fsp; - } else { - DEBUG(10,("OpenDir_fsp: SMB_VFS_FDOPENDIR on %s returned " - "NULL (%s)\n", - dirp->dir_path, - strerror(errno))); - if (errno != ENOSYS) { - return NULL; - } + dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_FDOPENDIR(fsp, mask, attr); + if (dirp->dir != NULL) { + dirp->fsp = fsp; + } else { + DEBUG(10,("OpenDir_fsp: SMB_VFS_FDOPENDIR on %s returned " + "NULL (%s)\n", + dirp->dir_path, + strerror(errno))); + if (errno != ENOSYS) { + return NULL; } } -- 2.9.3 From 031ba3f1427d97c48e9911dc98a125661d9088ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 12:15:59 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 05/11] s3: smbd: OpenDir_fsp() - Fix memory leak on error. CVE-2017-2619 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison --- source3/smbd/dir.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/source3/smbd/dir.c b/source3/smbd/dir.c index ea4f1ab..b8034be 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/dir.c +++ b/source3/smbd/dir.c @@ -1742,7 +1742,7 @@ static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_fsp(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, dirp->dir_path, strerror(errno))); if (errno != ENOSYS) { - return NULL; + goto fail; } } -- 2.9.3 From 54d9bb3aa5b14e51bb1a2fe60ec20bc1cdad373f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 12:32:07 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 06/11] s3: smbd: Move the reference counting and destructor setup to just before retuning success. CVE-2017-2619 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison --- source3/smbd/dir.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/source3/smbd/dir.c b/source3/smbd/dir.c index b8034be..6b62f14 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/dir.c +++ b/source3/smbd/dir.c @@ -1728,11 +1728,6 @@ static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_fsp(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, goto fail; } - if (sconn && !sconn->using_smb2) { - sconn->searches.dirhandles_open++; - } - talloc_set_destructor(dirp, smb_Dir_destructor); - dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_FDOPENDIR(fsp, mask, attr); if (dirp->dir != NULL) { dirp->fsp = fsp; @@ -1757,6 +1752,11 @@ static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_fsp(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, goto fail; } + if (sconn && !sconn->using_smb2) { + sconn->searches.dirhandles_open++; + } + talloc_set_destructor(dirp, smb_Dir_destructor); + return dirp; fail: -- 2.9.3 From 1265c298699e0b3a3000e70e07d815c459ff461e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 12:35:32 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 07/11] s3: smbd: Correctly fallback to open_dir_safely if FDOPENDIR not supported on system. CVE-2017-2619 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison --- source3/smbd/dir.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/source3/smbd/dir.c b/source3/smbd/dir.c index 6b62f14..3432788 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/dir.c +++ b/source3/smbd/dir.c @@ -1742,14 +1742,13 @@ static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_fsp(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, } if (dirp->dir == NULL) { - /* FDOPENDIR didn't work. Use OPENDIR instead. */ - dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_OPENDIR(conn, dirp->dir_path, mask, attr); - } - - if (!dirp->dir) { - DEBUG(5,("OpenDir_fsp: Can't open %s. %s\n", dirp->dir_path, - strerror(errno) )); - goto fail; + /* FDOPENDIR is not supported. Use OPENDIR instead. */ + TALLOC_FREE(dirp); + return open_dir_safely(mem_ctx, + conn, + fsp->fsp_name->base_name, + mask, + attr); } if (sconn && !sconn->using_smb2) { -- 2.9.3 From 1c0a1c566a9a43c9c81d42e48b85109a34a486dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 12:52:13 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 08/11] s3: smbd: Remove O_NOFOLLOW guards. We insist on O_NOFOLLOW existing. CVE-2017-2619 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison --- source3/smbd/open.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/source3/smbd/open.c b/source3/smbd/open.c index 25cf417..03a994a 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/open.c +++ b/source3/smbd/open.c @@ -356,8 +356,7 @@ NTSTATUS fd_open(struct connection_struct *conn, struct smb_filename *smb_fname = fsp->fsp_name; NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK; -#ifdef O_NOFOLLOW - /* + /* * Never follow symlinks on a POSIX client. The * client should be doing this. */ @@ -365,12 +364,10 @@ NTSTATUS fd_open(struct connection_struct *conn, if ((fsp->posix_flags & FSP_POSIX_FLAGS_OPEN) || !lp_follow_symlinks(SNUM(conn))) { flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; } -#endif fsp->fh->fd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(conn, smb_fname, fsp, flags, mode); if (fsp->fh->fd == -1) { int posix_errno = errno; -#ifdef O_NOFOLLOW #if defined(ENOTSUP) && defined(OSF1) /* handle special Tru64 errno */ if (errno == ENOTSUP) { @@ -387,7 +384,6 @@ NTSTATUS fd_open(struct connection_struct *conn, if (errno == EMLINK) { posix_errno = ELOOP; } -#endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */ status = map_nt_error_from_unix(posix_errno); if (errno == EMFILE) { static time_t last_warned = 0L; -- 2.9.3 From a34ff44b2cbd396c678aebfc299495ddad6b91d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 12:56:08 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 09/11] s3: smbd: Move special handling of symlink errno's into a utility function. CVE-2017-2619 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison --- source3/smbd/open.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/source3/smbd/open.c b/source3/smbd/open.c index 03a994a..616363d 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/open.c +++ b/source3/smbd/open.c @@ -345,6 +345,31 @@ static NTSTATUS check_base_file_access(struct connection_struct *conn, } /**************************************************************************** + Handle differing symlink errno's +****************************************************************************/ + +static int link_errno_convert(int err) +{ +#if defined(ENOTSUP) && defined(OSF1) + /* handle special Tru64 errno */ + if (err == ENOTSUP) { + err = ELOOP; + } +#endif /* ENOTSUP */ +#ifdef EFTYPE + /* fix broken NetBSD errno */ + if (err == EFTYPE) { + err = ELOOP; + } +#endif /* EFTYPE */ + /* fix broken FreeBSD errno */ + if (err == EMLINK) { + err = ELOOP; + } + return err; +} + +/**************************************************************************** fd support routines - attempt to do a dos_open. ****************************************************************************/ @@ -367,23 +392,7 @@ NTSTATUS fd_open(struct connection_struct *conn, fsp->fh->fd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(conn, smb_fname, fsp, flags, mode); if (fsp->fh->fd == -1) { - int posix_errno = errno; -#if defined(ENOTSUP) && defined(OSF1) - /* handle special Tru64 errno */ - if (errno == ENOTSUP) { - posix_errno = ELOOP; - } -#endif /* ENOTSUP */ -#ifdef EFTYPE - /* fix broken NetBSD errno */ - if (errno == EFTYPE) { - posix_errno = ELOOP; - } -#endif /* EFTYPE */ - /* fix broken FreeBSD errno */ - if (errno == EMLINK) { - posix_errno = ELOOP; - } + int posix_errno = link_errno_convert(errno); status = map_nt_error_from_unix(posix_errno); if (errno == EMFILE) { static time_t last_warned = 0L; -- 2.9.3 From 6c455324714936063d77ff15997fcaf651d40a5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 13:04:46 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 10/11] s3: smbd: Add the core functions to prevent symlink open races. CVE-2017-2619 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison --- source3/smbd/open.c | 237 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 237 insertions(+) diff --git a/source3/smbd/open.c b/source3/smbd/open.c index 616363d..954cd9c 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/open.c +++ b/source3/smbd/open.c @@ -369,6 +369,243 @@ static int link_errno_convert(int err) return err; } +static int non_widelink_open(struct connection_struct *conn, + const char *conn_rootdir, + files_struct *fsp, + struct smb_filename *smb_fname, + int flags, + mode_t mode, + unsigned int link_depth); + +/**************************************************************************** + Follow a symlink in userspace. +****************************************************************************/ + +static int process_symlink_open(struct connection_struct *conn, + const char *conn_rootdir, + files_struct *fsp, + struct smb_filename *smb_fname, + int flags, + mode_t mode, + unsigned int link_depth) +{ + int fd = -1; + char *link_target = NULL; + int link_len = -1; + char *oldwd = NULL; + size_t rootdir_len = 0; + char *resolved_name = NULL; + bool matched = false; + int saved_errno = 0; + + /* + * Ensure we don't get stuck in a symlink loop. + */ + link_depth++; + if (link_depth >= 20) { + errno = ELOOP; + goto out; + } + + /* Allocate space for the link target. */ + link_target = talloc_array(talloc_tos(), char, PATH_MAX); + if (link_target == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + /* Read the link target. */ + link_len = SMB_VFS_READLINK(conn, + smb_fname->base_name, + link_target, + PATH_MAX - 1); + if (link_len == -1) { + goto out; + } + + /* Ensure it's at least null terminated. */ + link_target[link_len] = '\0'; + + /* Convert to an absolute path. */ + resolved_name = SMB_VFS_REALPATH(conn, link_target); + if (resolved_name == NULL) { + goto out; + } + + /* + * We know conn_rootdir starts with '/' and + * does not end in '/'. FIXME ! Should we + * smb_assert this ? + */ + rootdir_len = strlen(conn_rootdir); + + matched = (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name, rootdir_len) == 0); + if (!matched) { + errno = EACCES; + goto out; + } + + /* + * Turn into a path relative to the share root. + */ + if (resolved_name[rootdir_len] == '\0') { + /* Link to the root of the share. */ + smb_fname->base_name = talloc_strdup(talloc_tos(), "."); + if (smb_fname->base_name == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + } else if (resolved_name[rootdir_len] == '/') { + smb_fname->base_name = &resolved_name[rootdir_len+1]; + } else { + errno = EACCES; + goto out; + } + + oldwd = vfs_GetWd(talloc_tos(), conn); + if (oldwd == NULL) { + goto out; + } + + /* Ensure we operate from the root of the share. */ + if (vfs_ChDir(conn, conn_rootdir) == -1) { + goto out; + } + + /* And do it all again.. */ + fd = non_widelink_open(conn, + conn_rootdir, + fsp, + smb_fname, + flags, + mode, + link_depth); + if (fd == -1) { + saved_errno = errno; + } + + out: + + SAFE_FREE(resolved_name); + TALLOC_FREE(link_target); + if (oldwd != NULL) { + int ret = vfs_ChDir(conn, oldwd); + if (ret == -1) { + smb_panic("unable to get back to old directory\n"); + } + TALLOC_FREE(oldwd); + } + if (saved_errno != 0) { + errno = saved_errno; + } + return fd; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Non-widelink open. +****************************************************************************/ + +static int non_widelink_open(struct connection_struct *conn, + const char *conn_rootdir, + files_struct *fsp, + struct smb_filename *smb_fname, + int flags, + mode_t mode, + unsigned int link_depth) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + int fd = -1; + struct smb_filename *smb_fname_rel = NULL; + int saved_errno = 0; + char *oldwd = NULL; + char *parent_dir = NULL; + const char *final_component = NULL; + + if (!parent_dirname(talloc_tos(), + smb_fname->base_name, + &parent_dir, + &final_component)) { + goto out; + } + + oldwd = vfs_GetWd(talloc_tos(), conn); + if (oldwd == NULL) { + goto out; + } + + /* Pin parent directory in place. */ + if (vfs_ChDir(conn, parent_dir) == -1) { + goto out; + } + + /* Ensure the relative path is below the share. */ + status = check_reduced_name(conn, final_component); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + saved_errno = map_errno_from_nt_status(status); + goto out; + } + + smb_fname_rel = synthetic_smb_fname(talloc_tos(), + final_component, + smb_fname->stream_name, + &smb_fname->st); + + flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; + + { + struct smb_filename *tmp_name = fsp->fsp_name; + fsp->fsp_name = smb_fname_rel; + fd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(conn, smb_fname_rel, fsp, flags, mode); + fsp->fsp_name = tmp_name; + } + + if (fd == -1) { + saved_errno = link_errno_convert(errno); + if (saved_errno == ELOOP) { + if (fsp->posix_flags & FSP_POSIX_FLAGS_OPEN) { + /* Never follow symlinks on posix open. */ + goto out; + } + if (!lp_follow_symlinks(SNUM(conn))) { + /* Explicitly no symlinks. */ + goto out; + } + /* + * We have a symlink. Follow in userspace + * to ensure it's under the share definition. + */ + fd = process_symlink_open(conn, + conn_rootdir, + fsp, + smb_fname_rel, + flags, + mode, + link_depth); + if (fd == -1) { + saved_errno = + link_errno_convert(errno); + } + } + } + + out: + + TALLOC_FREE(parent_dir); + TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname_rel); + + if (oldwd != NULL) { + int ret = vfs_ChDir(conn, oldwd); + if (ret == -1) { + smb_panic("unable to get back to old directory\n"); + } + TALLOC_FREE(oldwd); + } + if (saved_errno != 0) { + errno = saved_errno; + } + return fd; +} + /**************************************************************************** fd support routines - attempt to do a dos_open. ****************************************************************************/ -- 2.9.3 From 0eb718b5cc05adbcb20ac5b9b0eee71aa2af81ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 13:06:31 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 11/11] s3: smbd: Use the new non_widelink_open() function. CVE-2017-2619 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison --- source3/smbd/open.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/source3/smbd/open.c b/source3/smbd/open.c index 954cd9c..7274ae4 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/open.c +++ b/source3/smbd/open.c @@ -627,7 +627,28 @@ NTSTATUS fd_open(struct connection_struct *conn, flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; } - fsp->fh->fd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(conn, smb_fname, fsp, flags, mode); + /* Ensure path is below share definition. */ + if (!lp_widelinks(SNUM(conn))) { + const char *conn_rootdir = SMB_VFS_CONNECTPATH(conn, + smb_fname->base_name); + if (conn_rootdir == NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + /* + * Only follow symlinks within a share + * definition. + */ + fsp->fh->fd = non_widelink_open(conn, + conn_rootdir, + fsp, + smb_fname, + flags, + mode, + 0); + } else { + fsp->fh->fd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(conn, smb_fname, fsp, flags, mode); + } + if (fsp->fh->fd == -1) { int posix_errno = link_errno_convert(errno); status = map_nt_error_from_unix(posix_errno); -- 2.9.3